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I
INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the nature and scope of the dif-
ferences between the Data Sharing Project conducted by the Physician Insurers
Association of America (“PIAA”) and the National Practitioner Data Bank
(“NPDB”), which is operated by the U.S. Department of Health and Human
Services.  These data collection and dissemination projects are similar in the
sense that they were both designed to capture codified information regarding
medical malpractice claims.  However, they are very different in their purposes
and in the nature of the data captured.
The NPDB was originally developed to help identify “problem practitio-
ners” on a national basis.  This purpose differs greatly from the purpose of the
PIAA Data Sharing Project, which was designed to provide clinical loss preven-
tion data for use in physician education programs.  Indicative of the wide dif-
ference between the two systems, of the seventy-six data fields found in these
two data bases, only seven are common to both.
The PIAA Data Sharing Project is utilized extensively by the insurance
company members of the Association and others to provide evidence of the
medical conditions, procedures, and practices that give rise to medical malprac-
tice claims.  It relies on a complex code system incorporating the International
Classification of Diseases, 9th. Clinical Modification (ICD-9), to identify medi-
cal conditions and treatments, and on other systems of specialized codes to ac-
count for medico-legal issues.  Importantly, it does not identify individual prac-
titioners.
In addition to medical malpractice payment data, the NPDB captures in-
formation regarding hospital privilege restrictions and revocations, licensure,
and other disciplinary actions taken by regulatory authorities.  The NPDB col-
lectively refers to these as “adverse actions.”  Adverse actions encompass only
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18.6% of the records reported to the NPDB, and these incidents are not cap-
tured by the PIAA.1  Consequently, this paper will focus only on the compari-
son of malpractice claims data collection efforts.
The NPDB data was designed to meet the original purpose of the Data
Bank—to identify individual practitioners.  Only one data field, a generic act or
omission code (two per record), permits the capture of information regarding
the substance of the malpractice claim.  Therefore, the NPDB is ill suited for
research regarding the nature of malpractice claims and industry trends.
Despite this unsuitability, the NPDB has embarked upon a research agenda,
which includes drawing conclusions regarding the incidence of claims and sub-
stantive research into the underlying causes or extent of medical malpractice.
In addition to the unsuitability of the data captured by the NPDB for these
purposes, the existing data has a number of definitional shortcomings that af-
fect analytical accuracy:
(1)  The NPDB payment data field captures the value of the first
payment made on a claim, but subsequent payments are not reported.
While this serves as an indication that a payment has been made, it
does not provide an accurate measure of the amount of the total in-
demnity paid on any claim.
(2)  The NPDB does not have the resources to verify the accuracy of
the information reported to it, and acknowledges that it suffers from a
“lack of clarity, context, and consistency.”
(3)  The NPDB lacks a unique identifier for each individual practitio-
ner, making precise identification difficult and making it impossible to
link together payments made by multiple insurance carriers for the
same incident.
(4)  The act or omission codes collected by the NPDB are so general
in nature and duplicative that any conclusion drawn from them cannot
be relied upon.
(5)  In many instances, the NPDB cannot provide reliable information
regarding individual culpability in multiple defendant cases, where the
actual amount paid is reported on behalf of each individual is un-
known.  The NPDB requires that the total amount paid on behalf of
all defendants be reported for each defendant.  This affects the calcu-
lation of even the most basic statistics, such as mean and median pay-
ment values.
(6)  Financial payments to patients are not necessarily indicative of
physician negligence—a fact recognized in the authorizing legislation
of the NPDB.  The NPDB, however, lacks any peer review of the ac-
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tions reported to it, which would help to identify the payments indica-
tive of negligence.  Also, the NPDB attempts to do state-by-state
comparisons that ignore local differences in the way legal systems
handle malpractice actions, as well as distinct insurance requirements
and demographic variations.
The NPDB and PIAA data bases were designed for different purposes.
While current efforts to use the NPDB data for research into malpractice in-
surance trends suggest a substantive component to the NPDB data, a closer
look reveals these efforts to be fruitless.
II
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
A. The Rise of Physician-Owned or -Controlled Physician Insurers
Prior to the malpractice insurance availability crisis of the mid-1970s, the
standard commercial market provided most medical malpractice insurance
coverage for individual practitioners and institutions.  As it was then a small
line of business, these insurers made little effort to collect the data necessary
beyond basic financial statistics to understand the nature of medical malprac-
tice claims.  When the 1970s crisis hit, the insurers suddenly recognized that this
minor line of insurance was causing a major hemorrhage of their reserves.
Rather than attempt to learn more about medical malpractice issues and de-
termine the causes of the losses, most of the commercial carriers exited the
market.  Health care providers, who had already experienced skyrocketing in-
surance premiums, were faced with an even more onerous problem—the
threatened unavailability of insurance coverage at any price.
The medical professions responded to this crisis by forming a provider-
owned segment of the malpractice insurance industry.  As the major carriers
left the market, state and local medical associations formed their own carriers
ready to assume the commercial carriers’ former business.  Today, more than
fifty physician-owned or controlled companies provide the majority of medical
professional liability insurance coverage in the United States.  In addition to
providing insurance, these new companies were committed to collecting the
data necessary to permit adequate forecasting of loss trends, as well as identi-
fying the legal and clinical causes for medical accidents and claims.
B. Regulatory Attention
In response to growing concern over the malpractice issue, in 1975 the Na-
tional Association of Insurance Commissioners (“NAIC”) commissioned the
first comprehensive medical malpractice data collection effort in.2  This three-
year study required the mandatory reporting of data on all settled claims, and
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resulted in the production of the first national medical malpractice claims data.
However, this study was conducted only once, and ended in 1978.  Moreover,
such early data collection systems did not produce much relevant loss preven-
tion information.  Recognizing the value of compiling nationwide comprehen-
sive malpractice loss statistics on an ongoing basis, in 1985 the PIAA imple-
mented a standardized format for the collection of detailed data.3  This project
has grown to contain information on more than 160,000 medical malpractice
claims and legal actions.  The PIAA program sought to build upon the pio-
neering efforts of the NAIC study, and was expanded in scope to produce out-
put usable by the PIAA member companies in their risk management efforts.
C. Formation of the National Practitioner Data Bank
Public interest in the medical malpractice problem prompted Congress to
enact the Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986, which created the
NPDB.4  This Act sought to improve the quality of health care by encouraging
medical professionals to identify and discipline practitioners who engage in un-
professional behavior, and to restrict the ability of health care professionals to
move from locale to locale without disclosure of his or her adverse perform-
ance record.5  The first payment made in settlement of any malpractice action
triggers a report to the NPDB.6 Subsequent payments on the same claim are
not required to be reported to the Data Bank.7
The architects of the NPDB legislation directed that data be reported to
allow the identification of possible problem practitioners.8  Hospitals and other
health care entities would then use this data along with other evaluative and
credentialing information already in existence.9  The information collected was
not designed as a definitive measure of the quality of a practitioner’s perform-
ance, nor for use in measuring or analyzing the nature or trends in medical
malpractice claims data.
The role of the NPDB, as described in its 1996 Annual Report, is to be a
central repository of the following: (1) medical malpractice payment informa-
tion; (2) licensure actions taken against physicians and dentists; (3) mandatory
professional review actions taken against physicians and dentists, and optional
reviews of other licensed practitioners; and (4) actions taken against medical
professionals by the Drug Enforcement Agency.10  The data is intended to alert
health care entities, licensing authorities, and professional societies that they
                                                          
3. PHYSICIAN INSURERS ASS’N OF AM., DATA SHARING PROJECT REFERENCE MANUAL (1995)
[hereinafter PIAA REFERENCE MANUAL].
4. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 11101 - 11152 (1997).
5. See NATIONAL PRACTITIONER DATA BANK, NPDB GUIDEBOOK  A-2 (1994) [hereinafter
NPDB GUIDEBOOK].
6. See id.
7. See id.
8. See 42 U.S.C. §11131 (1997).
9. See id. §11135.
10. See NPDB ANNUAL  REPORT, supra note 1, at 2.
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may need to undertake further review of a practitioner’s background.11  The in-
formation is intended to augment and verify, not replace, other sources of in-
formation, including reports from entities such as state licensing boards, medi-
cal malpractice insurers, and prior employers.12  The NPDB was not designed to
provide all details of reported incidents or actions.13
The original legislation never contemplated that this information would be
made public (in other than aggregate statistical form) or used for unrelated re-
search purposes.14  The system was not designed with the detail needed to inves-
tigate meaningful comparative trends.15  Necessary information is missing: such
as the physician’s medical specialty, nature of the illness of the patient, diagno-
ses, medical procedures performed, and other similar data describing the medi-
cal treatment from which the malpractice action arose.  In addition, strict con-
fidentiality provisions were included in the regulations implementing the
legislation, requiring that information reported to the NPDB not be disclosed
outside the Department of Health and Human Services except to qualified que-
rying entities, such as hospitals and other health care organizations conducting
clinical peer review.16  Violators of the confidentiality provisions are subject to
civil penalties of up to $10,000.17
D. The Development of the PIAA Data Sharing Project
The Physician Insurers Association of America (“PIAA”) is a non profit
trade association, founded in 1977 to represent the interests of U.S.-based phy-
sician-owned or controlled professional liability insurance carriers.  While its
initial members were all providers of medical malpractice insurance which dealt
primarily with physicians, membership has been expanded to include dental in-
surance carriers and insurers operating outside the United States.  The current
membership consists of forty-five domestic physician insurers, three domestic
dental insurers, six foreign physician insurers, and six reinsurers.  The forty-
eight primary domestic carriers insure over 250,000 physicians and dentists.
One of the founding purposes of the PIAA was to exchange information re-
garding malpractice insurance industry trends and operations.  Each member
insurance company collected loss data for its own use.  It was apparent, how-
ever, that an individual company’s volume of claims was inadequate to accu-
rately evaluate claims trends.  For example, a carrier might expect to incur only
a few claims for the failure to diagnose or treat a fracture of the femur in any
year—too few from which to draw any conclusions regarding the nature of this
                                                          
11. See id.
12. See id.
13. See id.
14. See 42 U.S.C. §11137 (b)(1) (1997).
15. See Elements Under Consideration for Expanding the Research Capacity of the National
Practitioner Data Bank, 56 Fed. Reg. 8784 (proposed Mar. 1, 1991) [hereinafter EXPANDING NPDB
RESEARCH CAPACITY].
16. See 45 C.F.R. § 60.13 (1997).
17. 42 U.S.C. §11137(b)(2) (1997).
SMARR.FMT 04/01/98  8:13 AM
64 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 60: No. 1
claim type.
Thus, the concept of sharing and aggregating such information resulted in
the formation of the PIAA Data Sharing Project.  Twenty-four of the PIAA
member carriers participate in the Project, which began operation in 1985.18
While only PIAA member insurance carriers may report data to the Project,
analytical output from the database is provided to any inquiring entity.
The detailed data reported to the PIAA includes information regarding
claims filed only against physicians, dentists, and other health care providers.19
Ninety-eight percent of the claims reported are filed against physicians.  No in-
formation regarding the population of physicians from which the claims re-
sulted is reported, which makes it impossible to determine the incidence of
claims against any population of physicians.  Some view this as a shortcoming.
However, collecting underwriting information would allow the PIAA data
manager to approximate insurance rates and otherwise evaluate the perform-
ance of the carriers reporting the data.  This would not only create significant
antitrust issues for the Association, but would discourage PIAA members from
reporting because of competitive concerns.20  Confidentiality concerns are the
major reason only about half of the eligible PIAA members participate.  The
other reasons include cost and incompatibility with existing data systems.
III
A COMPARATIVE VIEW OF THE PIAA AND NPDB DATABASES
A. Overview of Differing Purposes
The PIAA Data Sharing System continues to track adverse medical out-
comes and financial trends for medical malpractice claims, including pending
claims and those settled with or without an indemnity payment.  This informa-
tion has helped member companies establish loss prevention initiatives aimed
at those claims having a high frequency or severity.  For example, many of the
PIAA member companies have utilized special reports and slide presentations
prepared by the PIAA regarding the failure to diagnose breast, colon and lung
cancer.
The NPDB captures information only on malpractice claims that result in a
settlement payment, which account for about thirty-two percent of all medical
malpractice claims resolved.21  The NPDB data set is composed of general in-
formation on the nature of the malpractice claims.  It does not, however, cap-
                                                          
18. See generally  PIAA REFERENCE MANUAL , supra note 3.
19. See generally id.
20. Because of these antitrust issues, premium and rating information should be collected by a
disinterested party, such as the Insurance Services Office.  While the PIAA could be viewed as a disin-
terested party, this does not prevent one of our members or a nonmember from alleging that we col-
lected the data for price-fixing or other anti-competitive purposes.  If the PIAA had premium data, it
would be able to calculate indicated future insurance premiums, and thus have highly desirable com-
petitive information.  This is a vulnerable place for a trade association to be.
21. See PHYSICIAN INSURERS ASS’N OF AM., PIAA DATA SHARING REPORTS 11 (1996).
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ture basic research demographics, such as the specialty of the physician.  The
ability of the NPDB to track the adverse medical outcome of a claim is limited
to one field in the Data Bank that contains a code indicating a generic act or
omission on the part of the doctor that gave rise to the claim.
By definition, the NPDB and PIAA data bases are different in purpose, and
were designed to satisfy different requirements.22  The PIAA data base remains
in use for its original purpose of providing a comprehensive loss prevention re-
source of detailed medical malpractice claims data.  However, the mission of
the NPDB has been expanded beyond its original purpose of identifying possi-
ble problem practitioners to include a research agenda aimed at evaluating
trends in medical malpractice claims experience.23  
A side-by-side analysis is necessary to understand the differences in the
data captured in the PIAA and NPDB databases.  While only seven of the data
elements are identical, some are similar.  Forty-five fields are unique to the
PIAA repository, mostly capturing cause-of-loss,  medico-legal, and demo-
graphic information.24  Twenty-four fields are unique to the NPDB, mainly in-
volving the identification of the practitioner, identification of the reporting en-
tity and payment information.
A comprehensive field-by-field analysis of the two repositories is under-
taken in the Appendix A.  The overlap of information between the two data-
bases is minimal, with many of the common data elements being descriptive
and administrative in nature, such as the reporting entity’s identification num-
ber.  The majority of the data in the PIAA Data Sharing Project is designed to
capture the nature of the medical malpractice incident, while the majority of
the data in the NPDB is designed to identify the practitioner involved in the
malpractice incident.
It is important to recognize that both of these data bases are now viewed by
their owners as credible sources of medical malpractice data for loss prevention
and research purposes.  However, in the case of the NPDB, the design of the
data base and included data elements severely limit its application in this re-
gard.  This was recognized by the Division of Quality Assurance at the U.S.
Department of Health and Human Services soon after the NPDB opened its
doors in 1990, when the Division published a notice of proposed rulemaking to
expand the NPDB to include additional data elements.  The notice specifically
stated that “in order to increase the usefulness of the data Bank  as a research
resource, the data currently collected from medical malpractice payors would
require expansion.”25  The pursuit of additional data elements was subsequently
                                                          
22. See  PIAA REFERENCE MANUAL, supra note 3.
23. See NATIONAL PRACTITIONER DATA BANK, NATIONAL PRACTITIONER DATA BANK
EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE MEETING REPORT FOR THE DECEMBER 4, 1996 EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE
MEETING, JANUARY 6, 1997, PANEL DISCUSSION: USES OF DATA AND NEED FOR DATA 18-21 (1997).
24. Medico-legal information is information regarding legal issues which can be the primary cause
or a contributing factor in a malpractice claim.  Examples include informed consent, assault, and aban-
donment.
25. EXPANDING NPDB RESEARCH CAPACITY, 56 Fed. Reg., supra note 15.
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dropped by the Department.
B. Performance and Analytical Considerations
1. The PIAA Data Sharing Project.  The PIAA Data Sharing Project has
been in operation since 1985.  More than 156,000 claims and suits have been
reported, which in most cases provides statistically significant data for
analytical purposes.26  The data have been used over the years by PIAA
member companies and others to support loss prevention programs, to measure
the cost of losses for certain medical procedures, and to assess financial trends
in medical malpractice indemnity and expense payments.
As previously noted, a perceived shortcoming that was designed into the
system from its inception is the lack of an exposure base (number of doctors) to
measure the incidence of claims for various demographic elements such as
medical specialty or for the performance of certain procedures.  The individual
reporting insurance companies do have this information, and the PIAA pro-
vides special editions of the standard semi-annual reports to these companies
which contain only their reported data.  Such disaggregation of an individual
insurer’s data allows the companies to compare their own experiences with the
national experience, and to compare their loss data to the population from
which the claims arose.  Individual company experience is provided only to the
reporting company.  Increasingly, PIAA members are expanding their markets
into multiple states, although many still principally underwrite in only one
state.  For this reason, state-by-state comparisons are performed only with the
permission of the reporting companies.
Maintaining the accuracy of the reported data is an ongoing process.  Many
of the critical data elements require codification utilizing ICD-9, which is a hi-
erarchical codification system designed for  1) the classification of morbidity
and mortality information for statistical purposes; 2) the indexing of hospital
records by disease; and 3) operations for data storage and retrieval.  Due to the
complexities of the ICD-9 codification system, persons knowledgeable and
trained in its use are required to perform the file coding.  These individuals
must also have a working knowledge of the process of handling claims, and be
proficient in medical and legal terminology.  The PIAA assists its member
companies in identifying the requirements for coding personnel, and conducts
structured coding classes for both new and experienced personnel.  The PIAA
staff also makes site visits to the member companies to provide refresher
training and to deal with special problems or situations.  Although with the
data system complications have been minimal throughout the life of the proj-
ect, the PIAA also provides consultation in this area.
2. The National Practitioner Data Bank.  The NPDB has been in operation
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since September 1990.27  Although it had many data system problems in the
early years, it now appears to be performing its designed function at an
acceptable level.28  While the operational areas of the NPDB function properly,
the level of reporting accuracy relies on the diligence of those required to make
reports.  The NPDB recognizes the necessity of achieving consistency among
those reports.  While the large number of reporting entities makes individual
training virtually impossible,  the NPDB publishes a guidebook and maintains a
toll-free number for training purposes.
However, difficulties still exist in the interpretation of the enabling legisla-
tion and in the nature of the information required to be reported.  For example,
since the genesis of the NPDB, there has been confusion about the “corporate
shield” issue.  The corporate shield refers to the situation where the medical
corporation for which the doctor works is named in the suit, and the doctor is
either not originally named or is released specifically for the purpose of avoid-
ing a report to the NPDB.  There is evidence that some insurers will “cut a
deal” with the plaintiff’s  attorney to dismiss the doctor from the suit and let
the payment be made entirely on behalf of the corporation, hospital, or other
entity.  These payments are often not reported to the NPDB, and a possibly
negligent doctor is never reported.  Although some entities report these claims
in compliance with their interpretation of the NPDB requirements,  NPDB of-
ficials acknowledge that “the number of malpractice-payment reports may have
been affected by the ‘corporate shield’ effect,” but the extent to which this oc-
curs “cannot be conclusively measured by available data.”29  Based upon his
participation in a large number of malpractice cases, plaintiffs’ lawyer Jack H.
Olender estimates that this number may be as high as fifty percent.30
NPDB officials have acknowledged that “the value of the Data Bank is di-
minished by the lack of clarity, context, and consistency in reporting.  In effect,
lack of uniformity in reporting limits the usefulness of the data.”31  Specifically,
different interpretations of the reporting requirements may result in incom-
plete or inaccurate reporting of a situation.  This, in turn, may lead to misinter-
pretation of the results either when queried or conducting research.
Identifying the practitioners for whom information has been reported is the
core goal of the NPDB.  However, the data system was designed without pro-
viding for a unique identifier for each individual practitioner, such as the practi-
tioner’s Social Security number or the medical education number assigned to
                                                          
27. See Robert E. Oshel et al., The National Practitioner Data Bank: The First 4 Years, 110 PUB.
HEALTH REP. 383, 385 (1995).
28. See DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, DIV. OF QUALITY ASSURANCE, NATIONAL
PRACTITIONER DATA BANK: USER SATISFACTION WITH REPORTING AND QUERYING AND
USEFULNESS OF DISCLOSURE INFORMATION FOR DECISION MAKING, 1992-1994, at xi (1995)
[HEREINAFTER NPDB USER SATISFACTION].
29. Wayne J. Guglielmo, Are Doctors Evading The Malpractice Data Bank?, MED. ECON., May
28, 1996, at 53.
30. See id.
31. Stephen B. Permison et al., The NPDB Reflects on Issues of Reportability (visited Jan. 29,
1998) <http://www.usmedicine.com/npdb.html>.
SMARR.FMT 04/01/98  8:13 AM
68 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 60: No. 1
all physicians by the American Medical Association. To identify individuals
and link their collective experience, the NPDB relies on a combination of re-
ported data elements that include the last name, first name, birth date, and
medical school of the practitioner.  The social security number and the federal
Drug Enforcement Agency identification number are included in the data file,
but are optional fields.  Thus, they are not reliable as identifiers.
Another essential element missing from the NPDB  is the ability to account
for and aggregate multiple malpractice payments resulting from a single inci-
dent.  There is no mechanism to assure that payments by multiple insurers or
multiple payments made by one insurer are not represented as multiple inci-
dents.  For example, in states where a patient compensation fund exists, a
medical malpractice carrier will typically pay the physician’s basic policy limit
of the verdict or settlement, with the remainder being paid by the compensa-
tion fund.  There is no case identifier stored in the NPDB that permits the elec-
tronic matching of these multiple payments.  The same is true for payments
made under commercial excess insurance policies, and in situations where mul-
tiple primary carriers make payments on behalf of the same practitioners.32
Thus, multiple payments made by multiple payors on behalf of the same practi-
tioner for the same incident appear as separate incidents in the NPDB file.  It is
critical that credentialing committees are able to recognize this situation when
hospitals are using this information to make decisions regarding the grant of
clinical privileges.  Additionally, as a result of multiple reporting, NPDB statis-
tics are likely to be erroneous when used to measure the number of claims re-
ported and average payment size.
Querying entities are also not able to glean reliable information from the
NPDB regarding individual culpability in multiple defendant cases.  Because
many malpractice actions involve multiple defendants, it is not uncommon for a
single payment to be made on behalf of several practitioners who treated a pa-
tient.  It is not always possible to discern the extent of liability for each individ-
ual, especially in the situation where the claim is expeditiously settled before
extensive discovery or expert review.  The NPDB provides a field on the re-
porting form for the amount of the first payment on any claim and the number
of practitioners for which that payment is made.  In many multiple defendant
cases, it is impossible to judge the amount of liability, if any, that should be as-
sessed to each practitioner for whom an individual report will be filed.  There
are also no means for NPDB reports to link together the individual practitio-
ners involved in the incident.
3. Other Problems That Hinder Fair and Complete Reporting to the NPDB.
Monetary settlements to patients are often not indicative of negligent
treatment by a physician.  Settlements are often made when it is more cost-
                                                          
32. Typically, a medical malpractice insurance policy covers a physician for any payment not to
exceed the “primary limit,” which  is usually $1,000,000 for any incident.  A “commercial excess insur-
ance policy” increases a physician’s coverage beyond this primary limit.  This coverage is normally sold
in multiples of $1 million, up to $10 million.
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effective for the insurer to pay a small amount of indemnity rather than to incur
the costs of litigation to defend the claim.  NPDB officials have stated that
“since the Data Bank serves only as a flagging system, the mere existence of a
report in the Data Bank should not be taken by professional reviewers to mean
that a practitioner has performed incompetently.”33  For example, it is not
uncommon for anesthesiologists or certified registered nurse anesthetists to
dislodge a tooth or filling during intubation or extubation.  This is often caused
by the poor condition of the patient’s dentitia, and can result in a small
settlement to compensate the patient for damage or replacement, which must
be reported to the NPDB.
A related problem with monetary settlements is that there are a number of
malpractice insurance policies that do not require the practitioner’s consent to
settle a malpractice claim.  It is not uncommon for an insurer to settle with the
patient in order to avoid increased costs as a result of a lengthy discovery and
negotiation period.  Therefore, it is possible for an insurer to make a payment
on behalf of a physician without allowing him or her to provide input to the in-
surer regarding the circumstances surrounding the alleged incident.  Such prac-
tices do not take into account the quality of medical care, as the decision to set-
tle was purely economic. Nonetheless, the payments must be reported to the
NPDB and are available to querying entities.
The authors of the NPDB legislation acknowledge this economic impetus to
settlements.  The Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986 states that “a
payment in settlement of a medical malpractice action or claim shall not be
construed as creating a presumption that medical malpractice has occurred.”34
A focus group on reportability conducted by the Health and Human Services
Division of Quality Assurance found that, given the absence of peer review of
the actions reported to the NPDB, it is impossible to determine which malprac-
tice payments reflect a practitioner’s level of incompetence.35 The focus group
found  that claims paid due to expediency should be differentiated from those
paid because of actual fault.36  NPDB reports are not clear whether a malprac-
tice payment does or does not correspond to medical competence.37 Rather, the
querying entity is left to make that judgment, potentially at the expense of the
practitioner.  This is supported by the NPDB Guidebook, which states that “a
payment made in settlement of a medical malpractice action or claim shall not
be construed as a presumption that medical malpractice has occurred.”38
The conclusion that data resulting from claims based on negligence should
be distinguished from other claims is further supported by a study published in
the New England Journal of Medicine, which indicates that only 23.8% of
                                                          
33. Oshel, supra note 27.
34. 42 U.S.C. §11137(d).
35. See generally Permison et al, supra note 31.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. NPDB GUIDEBOOK, supra note 5.
SMARR.FMT 04/01/98  8:13 AM
70 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 60: No. 1
claims closed with an indemnity payment were a result of negligent treatment.39
Ironically, the paid claims resulting from negligence had indemnity payment
values thirty-two percent less than the paid claims that did not result from neg-
ligence.40  The major conclusion of this study was that “the severity of the pa-
tient’s disability, not the occurrence of an adverse event or an adverse event
due to negligence, was predictive of payment to the plaintiff.”41
From an evaluative standpoint, perhaps the biggest shortcoming of the
NPDB data set is its inability to identify a physician’s specialty.  Therefore, no
distinction is given to specialty groups with a higher expected frequency or se-
verity of paid malpractice claims.  In order to identify the real outliers, a que-
rying entity should have the benefit of comparative specialty data when re-
viewing the payment reports.
4. NPDB  Limitations That Affect Research.  NPDB officials assert that
their data can be used to describe almost all malpractice payments made on
behalf of practitioners in the nation.42  They claim that state legislators can use
this data to compare the pattern of malpractice payments in their state with
neighboring states.43  However, NPDB officials fail to account for the state-to-
state differences in the legal systems handling malpractice actions, as well as
distinct insurance requirements and demographic variations.
The NPDB is plagued by data definition problems and missing data ele-
ments which seem to be essential.  Despite this, the NPDB staff contends that
the malpractice payment data has advantages for analytical research into indus-
try values and trends.44  NPDB officials assert that their repository is the only
comprehensive national malpractice payment data set.45  With about 125,000
malpractice payments to date, it will grow over time to be the largest data base.
However, its inherent limitations, such as the lack of physician, patient, and
treatment demographics and incomplete payment data do not allow for fair
comparative analyses.  Unfortunately, these issues are not easy to resolve, and
the collection of more appropriate research data would require redesigning the
data base and making a completely new collection effort.
In addition, NPDB officials report “because of their uniquely comprehen-
sive nature, the Data Bank malpractice payment data are also attractive for
use, albeit with caution, in studies assessing the underlying extent of medical
malpractice incompetence.”46  This is in sharp contrast to the original Act’s ac-
knowledgment that the existence of a malpractice payment does not necessarily
                                                          
39. Troyen A. Brennan et al., Relation Between Negligent Adverse Events and the Outcomes of
Medical Malpractice Litigation, 335 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1963 (1996).
40. See id.
41. See id.
42. See Oshel, supra note 27.
43. See id.
44. See id.
45. See id.
46. Id.
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mean that malpractice has occurred.47  However, NPDB officials believe that
the validity of assumptions necessary to make the connection between pay-
ments and incompetency would be fruitful subjects for further research.48  This
view represents a significant departure from the NPDB’s original purpose.
Given the questionable quality of the limited data available, the extent to
which payment data may be indicative of physician performance should be an
issue of grave concern for the medical profession.
5. Problems the NPDB Has Caused for Practitioners.  There is evidence
that the introduction of the NPDB reporting requirements have made
physicians much less willing to consent to settle claims.49  Seventy-six percent of
malpractice insurers queried by the Data Bank in 1994 reported that claims
resolution had been affected by NPDB reporting, with 83 percent of larger
insurers reporting that practitioners had become less willing to settle cases.50
The size of the malpractice payment was not a factor.51 For those practitioners
insured under policies which require their prior consent to settle a claim,
certainly a record in the NPDB is a consideration.  Reporting requirements
have been especially influential deterrents to settlement in those instances in
which there was no departure from the standard of care but the risk of a large
trial verdict remains.
Health care practitioners feel they are being stigmatized when they are re-
ported to the NPDB for any reason.52  Practitioners have expressed concern that
there is little distinction between various magnitudes of gravity for which a
practitioner may be reported.53  In other words, there is no measure but the size
of the malpractice payment, which has been demonstrated to be arbitrary, to
indicate the degree of incompetence.  However, the frequency of malpractice
payments was determined by the NPDB to be a more important factor to que-
rying entities than the size of the payment.54
In the past three federal legislative sessions, bills were introduced that
would allow public access to the information reported to the NPDB.55  Viewed
in the context of the original assurances of confidentiality made when the
NPDB was created, public access has the potential to hamper seriously the phy-
sician’s willingness to settle a claim and to cause physicians’ competency to be
questioned based on incomplete information.  The fact that it takes almost five
years to make a malpractice insurance payment after the incident occurs guar-
antees that the NPDB will not provide timely information for its original pur-
                                                          
47. See 42 U.S.C. §11137(d).
48. See Oshel, supra note 27.
49. See NPDB USER SATISFACTION, supra note 28, at 28-29.
50. See id.
51. See id.
52. See Permison, supra note 31.
53. See id.
54. See NPDB USER SATISFACTION,  supra note 28, at 28-29.
55. See S. 2004, 104th Cong. (1996); H.R. 4272, 103d Cong. (1994).
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pose—identifying practitioners who may have a competency problem.56
6. PIAA Data Sharing Information.  The PIAA Data Sharing Project
collects data on a semi-annual basis from twenty-four participating companies.
A major difference between the PIAA Data Sharing System and the NPDB is
that the Data Sharing System includes claims closed with no indemnity
payment.  This increases the number of closed claims reported by more than
200 percent, as seventy percent (in 1996) of all claims and suits are closed with
no indemnity payment.57  PIAA data show that the average claim with an
indemnity payment takes about fifty-nine months to resolve from the incident
date.  Claims with no payment are resolved in an average of fifth-three months.
Lawsuits that have been open for one year are also reportable to the Data
Sharing System, and the average age of this information when reported is only
twenty-one months from the date of the incident.58  This allows for more
comprehensive analyses of claim trends and provides more current information
with regard to claims involving new or controversial procedures.
As previously noted, the PIAA database was created primarily as a loss
prevention tool.  The data allow users to look at the conditions or procedures
for any major specialty group that most frequently result in an adverse out-
come.  In addition, information such as the degree of severity of the patient’s
injury is captured, which is helpful in looking at the events that result in the
most serious outcomes.  Examples of output from the PIAA data base are pro-
vided in Appendix B.
IV
CONCLUSION
It is difficult and inappropriate to compare the NPDB and the PIAA Data
Sharing Project as similar data capture systems.  Each system was designed for
a different purpose.  The NPDB was specifically intended to identify individual
practitioners, while the PIAA Data Sharing Project was designed to capture in-
dustry trends, and does not contain any information that permits the identifica-
tion of individual practitioners.  While current efforts to use the NPDB data for
research into malpractice insurance trends suggest a substantive component to
the NPDB data, a closer look reveals these efforts to be fruitless.
                                                          
56. See PHYSICIAN INSURERS ASS’N OF AM., PIAA DATA SHARING REPORT nos. 13 & 14 (1996).
57. See PHYSICIAN INSURERS ASS’N OF AM., PIAA DATA SHARING REPORT 11, supra note 21.
58. See PHYSICIAN INSURERS ASS’N OF AM., PIAA DATA SHARING REPORTS nos. 13 & 14, supra
note 56.
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APPENDIX A
PIAA DATA SHARING PROJECT—NATIONAL PRACTITIONER DATA BANK
COMMONALITY OF DATA ELEMENTS
(Y = PRESENT IN DATA BASE; N =  NOT PRESENT IN DATA BASE)
Description Of Data Element PIAA NPDB
Reporting Entity Identification Y Y
Reporting Entity ID Number N Y
Relationship Of Entity to Practitioner N Y
Type Of Report N Y
Entity Name And Address
Insurance And Legal Information
Incident Number (Case File Number) Y N
Insured Number (Claim File Number) Y N
Accident Date Y Y
Report Date Y N
Claim/Suit Date Y N
Close Date Y N
Payment Date N Y
Judgment Or Settlement Date N Y
Adjudicative Body Case Number N Y
Adjudicative Body Name N Y
Status (Open Or Closed File) Y N
Coverage Type (Claims Made Or Occurrence) Y N
Plaintiff/Patient Information
Age Y N
Gender Y N
Income Y N
Marital Status Y N
Collateral Source Payor Y N
Practitioner Information
Name N Y
Organization Name N Y
Work Address N Y
Home Address N Y
Country N Y
License Number N Y
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Description Of Data Element PIAA NPDB
State Of Licensure N Y
Field Of Licensure N Y
Social Security Number N Y
Federal DEA Number N Y
Professional School Attended N Y
Year Of Graduation N Y
Hospital Affiliation, City, State N Y
Specialty Y N
Board Certification Y N
Board Eligibility Y N
Insurance Policy Limits Y N
Type of Practice (Solo, Corporate, etc.) Y N
Medical School Attended Y Y
Full/Part Time Practice Y N
Age/Birth Date Of Practitioner Y Y
Gender Y N
Location Within Institution
Type Of Institution Y N
Incident Location Y N
Type Of Hospital Y N
State Where Action Brought Y N
Payment Data
Total Indemnity Paid For Practitioner Y N
Narrative Description Of Payment(s) N Y
Amount Of Initial Individual Indemnity Payment N Y
Indication Of Single Or Multiple Payments N Y
Number Of Practitioners For Which Payment Was Made N Y
Loss Adjustment Expenses—Defense Counsel Y N
Loss Adjustment Expenses—Expert Witness Y N
Total Loss Adjustment Expenses Y N
Lump Sum/Structured Settlement Y N
Cause Of Loss Information
Narrative Description Of Act Or Omission N Y
Severity Of Injury Indicator Y N
Medical Condition Y N
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Description Of Data Element PIAA NPDB
Misdiagnosis Y N
Care Rendered (Procedure Performed) Y N
Anesthesia Procedure Y N
Medical Misadventure Y Y
Treatment Delay/Not Performed Y N
Iatrogenic Injuries Y N
Medical Outcome Y N
Associated Legal Issues Y N
Associated Personnel Y N
Emergency Situation Y N
Treatment Length Y N
Disposition Code (Settlement, Judgment, etc.) Y Y
Disposition Time Y N
Review Panel Decision Y N
Arbitration Panel Decision Y N
Company Liability Decision Y N
Previous Claim Experience Y N
SUMMARY
Number Of Fields Both Databases Include 7
Number Of Fields Only PIAA Includes 45
Number Of Fields Only NPDB Includes 24
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APPENDIX B
EXAMPLES OF DATA TABULATED FROM PIAA DATA SHARING PROJECT
TABLE B1
CLOSED FILES
JAN. 1995 - JUNE 1997
% Closed Total Average
# Files Files Indemnity Paid Per File
Total Closed Files 135,423 100.0 $  6.5 Billion $  48,211
Files Closed
With Indemnity 43,020  31.8 $6.28 Billion $151,764
Files Closed
Without Indemnity 92,403 68.2 0 $0
Method of Payment: Lump Sum 39,760 (92.4%)
Structured Settlement  3,249(  7.6%)
TABLE B2
EXPENSE INFORMATION: ALL CLOSED CLAIMS
JAN. 1995 - JUNE 1997
# Files With Total Expenses Average Paid
Data Reported Dollars Paid Per File
ALAE – Defense Attorney  92,473 $1.35 Billion $14,633
ALAE – Expert Witnesses  61,077 $182 Million $ 2,978
ALAE – Other 100,829 $426 Million $ 4,234
TOTAL ALAE 118,541 $1.96 Billion $16,551
RATIO OF EXPENSE TO INDEMNITY: All Closed Claims: 30.1 cents expense per indemnity
dollar.
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TABLE B3
EXPENSE INFORMATION: CLOSED CLAIMS WITH INDEMNITY PAYMENT
JAN. 1995 - JUNE 1997
# Files With Total Expenses Average Paid
Data Reported Dollars Paid Per File
TOTAL ALAE 39,595 $936 Million $23,644
RATIO OF EXPENSE TO INDEMNITY: Closed Claims with Indemnity Payment: 14.3 cents
expense per indemnity dollar.
TABLE B4
SPECIALTY GROUP:  INTERNAL MEDICINE, NON-SURGICAL
CUMULATIVE ANALYSIS OF PROCEDURES PERFORMED
JAN. 1985 - DEC. 1994
Procedure Performed
Closed
Claims
Paid
Claims
% Paid/
Closed
Indemnity:
Total ($)
 Indemnity:
Average ($)
Diagnostic Interview,
Evaluation Or Consultation 5,754 1,313 22.82 189,470,745 144,304
Prescription Of Medication 2,275 808 35.52 96,657,558 119,626
General Physical Examination 917 217 29.55 45,407,918 167,557
Injections And Vaccinations 625 206 32.96 25,422,495 123,410
No Care Rendered 575 62 10.78 6,919,892 111,611
Diagnostic Procedures Inv.
Cardiac And Circulatory
Functions 478 151 31.59 33,549,452 222,182
Miscellaneous Manual Exams
& Non-Operative Procedures 427 119 27.87 18,981,186 159,506
Diagnostic Radiographic
Procedures, Exc. CAT Scans 364 161 44.23 29,174,955 181,211
Diagnostic Procedures
Of The Large Intestine 293 103 35.15 10,936,402 106,179
Cardiac Catheterization 140 37 26.43 7,191,406 194,362
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TABLE B5
SPECIALTY GROUP:  INTERNAL MEDICINE, NON-SURGICAL
CUMULATIVE ANALYSIS OF PATIENT CONDITION
JAN. 1985 - DEC. 1994
Patient Condition
Closed
Claims
Paid
Claims
% Paid/
Closed
 Indemnity:
Total ($)
 Indemnity:
Average ($)
Myocardial Infarction, Acute 617 225 36.5 44,670,027 198,533
Malignant Neoplasms Of The
Lung And Bronchus
466 166 35.6 29,580,025 178,193
Malignant Neoplasms Of The
Female Breast
294 121 41.2 21,387,248 176,754
Pulmonary Embolism 216 73 33.8 12,251,276 167,826
Diabetes 221 61 27.6 5,962,966 97,754
Renal Failure 212 36 17.0 6,705,616 186,267
Hypertension 182 47 25.8 6,515,053 138,618
Malignant Neoplasms Of The
Colon And Rectal Region
182 78 42.9 16,795,185 215,323
Pneumonia 178 52 29.2 7,087,913 136,306
Coronary Atherosclerosis 161 46 28.6 5,800,265 126,093
TABLE B6
SPECIALTY GROUP:  INTERNAL MEDICINE NON-SURGICAL
DIAGNOSIS ERROR CLAIMS —MOST PREVALENT CLAIMS
JAN. 1985 - DEC. 1994
Total
Files
Closed
Files
Paid
Files
% Paid/
Closed
Indemnity
Paid ($)
Avg.
Per Paid
File ($)
Errors In Diagnosis 4,710 3,842 1,383 36.00 225,612,873 163,133
Most Prevalent Conditions
Malignant Neoplasms Of
The Bronchus and Lung
308 259 116 44.79 20,794,198 179,260
Myocardial Infarction, Acute 244 193 95 49.22 20,338,997 214,095
Malignant Neoplasms Of
The Female Breast
182 148 76 51.35 14,874,441 195,716
Malignant Neoplasms Of
The Colon Or Rectal Region
108 91 49 53.85 11,081,044 226,144
Malignant Neoplasms Of
The Rectum Or Anus
99 76 40 52.63 11,073,549 276,839
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TABLE B7
SPECIALTY GROUP STATISTICS
JAN. 1985 - JUNE 1997
Specialty Group
# Files
Closed
# Files
Paid
% Paid/
Closed
Indemnity
Paid ($)
Avg. Per
Paid File ($)
Anesthesiolgy 5,364 1,972 36.76 343,800,412 $174,341
Cardio Diseases-NS* 1,749 326 18.64 60,143,653 $184,490
Cardio & Thoracic Surgery 3,657 888 24.28 142,528,653 $160,505
Dentists 403 200 49.63 7,607,768 $38,039
Dermatology- NS 1,526 489 32.04 37,402,563 $76,488
Emergency Med.- NS 1,971 557 28.26 78,183,950 $140,366
Gastroenterology- NS 995 223 22.41 27,339,986 $122,601
General Surgery 15,023 5,437 36.19 771,031,575 $141,812
General & Family Practice- NS 15,775 5,860 37.15 700,356,675 $119,515
Gynecology 1,621 532 32.82 60,623,133 $113,953
Internal Medicine- NS 17,725 4,847 27.35 721,401,701 $148,835
Neurology- NS 1,900 383 20.16 80,626,171 $210,512
Neurosurgery 3,318 950 28.63 221,733,153 $233,403
OB/GYN Surgery 19,249 7,030 36.52 1,501,245,591 $213,548
Ophthalmology 3,970 1,203 30.30 159,793,679 $132,829
Oral Surgery 39 13 33.33 438,583 $33,737
Orthopedic Surgery 14,101 4,235 30.03 554,906,002 $131,029
Other Nonsurgical Specialties 1,128 258 22.87 31,399,602 $121,704
Otorhinolaryngology 2,205 714 32.38 107,494,071 $150,552
Paraprofessional 35 3 8.57 779,000 $259,667
Pathology- NS 916 287 31.33 58,482,250 $203,771
Pediatrics- NS 4,270 1,253 29.34 279,705,207 $223,228
Plastic Surgery 5,319 1,582 29.74 131,000,643 $82,807
Psychiatry- NS 1,393 320 22.97 45,034,915 $140,734
Radiation Therapy- NS 1,034 232 22.44 49,294,292 $212,475
Radiology- NS 7,214 2,152 29.83 263,561,563 $122,473
Resident/Intern 109 36 33.03 1,957,182 $54,366
Urologic Surgery 3,414 1,308 30.40 127,313,842 $122,653
TOTALS 135,423 43,020 31.80 6,565,185,815 $152,608
* NS = “nonsurgical.”
